講座：Conflicting Interests and the Effect of Fiduciary Duty—Evidence from Variable Annuities
題 目：Conflicting Interests and the Effect of Fiduciary Duty—Evidence from Variable Annuities
嘉 賓：Shan Ge, Assistant Professor of Finance, New York University Stern School of Business
主持人：許文健 助理教授 上海交通大學安泰經濟與管理學院
We examine the market for variable annuities, a popular retirement product with over $2.2 trillion in assets. Insurers pay brokers commissions for selling annuities, and brokers typically earn higher commissions for selling more expensive annuities. Our results indicate that sales are five times as sensitive to brokers' financial interests as to investors'. To limit conflicts of interest, the Department of Labor proposed a rule in 2016 holding brokers to a fiduciary standard. We find that after the proposal, sales of high-expense products fell by 52% as sales became more sensitive to expenses. Based on our structural estimates, investor welfare improved overall.
Shan Ge is an Assistant Professor of Finance at New York University Stern School of Business. She obtained her PhD in Finance from the Ohio State University. Prof. Ge’s research focuses on corporate finance and the insurance industry. Her research examines how firms change their product pricing strategies when their financial conditions change, how internal capital markets affect subsidiaries’ behavior, and how firms’ financial strength shapes their financial asset portfolios. In one of her recent papers, she studies how a proposed regulation imposing fiduciary duty on brokers in the US affects a large market in the retirement saving space. Her research has been quoted by the US senate and featured in news outlets, such as the New York Times, and has also been published in top finance journals including Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, etc.